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Within a model where the parents make the decisions relating to their children’s 
education, we show that skill dynamics normally results in a sub-optimal situation 
involving income per capita. This derives from an under-education trap that is 
endogenously generated. When sub-optimality is caused by a lack of human capital 
at the steady state, a minimum wage or a redistribution policy makes it possible to 
increase output per capita and to reduce inequality because both increase the 
educated share of the population by raising certain households above the trap. 
These policies only need to be implemented over one period of time, i.e. one 
generation. Moreover, the sooner they are laid down, the more efficient these 
policies become. Finally, the income per head at the steady state is higher when 
individuals have naive expectations rather than when they have perfect predictions. 
Several simulations are performed that illustrate and corroborate these findings. 
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1     Introduction 
 
Since the seminal works by Becker (1974), Becker and Tomes (1976, 1979) and Tomes (1981), the 
analysis of intergenerational human capital mobility has experienced considerable developments. 
When the positive marginal impact of parents’ education on the human capital of their offspring is 
monotonously decreasing, all dynasties tend to the same human capital in the long term (Loury, 1981). 
Imperfections on the credit market can only slow this convergence down.  However, in cases of non 
convexity, and particularly when imperfections on the credit market are combined with threshold 
effects (minimum consumption, fixed cost of education), there is scope for under education traps 
(Barham and Boadway, 1995; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997): a number of dynasties are indefinitely 
maintained in a low skilled position and inequality is a lasting characteristic of the steady state. In such 
situations, government interventions could increase the number of families that opt for higher 
education. Apart from educational policy that is not analysed here, government intervention may then 
try to narrow the constraint on education by increasing the income of low paid workers. Two means of 
public interventions are then typically analysed, i.e. the setting of a minimum wage and a 
redistribution policy. However, both policies produce two opposite impacts on the education decision, 
in that they firstly boost education by releasing its financing constraint, but they also reduce the 
incentive to educate by lowering the relative return to skill.  
From a traditional neoclassical perspective, both the minimum wage and redistribution have unwilling 
outcomes. The minimum wage normally results in unemployment of the less skilled, except in the 
unlikely case of monopsony on the labour marker (Stigler, 1946). More recent analyses have shown 
that positive effects of a minimum wage on employment may appear in cases of efficiency wage 
(Manning, 1995, Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995) and matching approaches (Lang & Kahn, 1998). In 
addition, in a dynamic perspective, the setting of a minimum wage may foster education and training, 
and thereby boost growth (Cahuc and Michel, 1995; Agell and Lomerud, 1997; Ravn and Sorensen, 
1999; Ragacs, 2004).  
The disadvantage of redistribution normally stems from its negative impact on labour supply due to 
taxation, which creates a trade-off between growth and post-tax inequality. In a political economy 
perspective, this mechanism has been utilised to show that pre-tax inequality hampers growth because 
it incites the median voter to demand more redistribution (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). However, here 
again, certain approaches have shown that redistribution can boost growth by promoting education and 
training (Barham and Boadway, 1995; Orazem and Tesfatsion, 1997).  
Finally, the human capital intergenerational mobility as well as the impact on it of public intervention 
depends to a large extent on who takes the decision on education. When this decision belongs to the 
parents (Durlauf, 1996; Glomm, 1997; Nordblom, 2001; Viaene and Zilcha, 2001), the approach 
points to the impact of parents’ income on children’s education. The decision may also be taken by   3
children (Lucas, 1988, Galor and Zeira, 1993, Barham and Boadway, 1995
1; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997) 
or it may be the result of a bargaining process involving both parents and children (Glomm and 
Ravikumar, 1992; Orazem and Tesfatsion, 1997).  
In the model developed in this paper, the children’s education is decided by the parents. This is based 
on the hypothesis that there is no access to credit for youths, particularly for those from low income 
families. This assumption aims at modelling the situation of a large number of European countries, but 
it is not consistent with the North American situation. We show that the ‘natural’ skills dynamics 
normally leads to a sub-optimal situation regarding per capita income. This is due to an under-
education trap that is endogenously determined. When sub-optimality is caused by a lack of human 
capital, egalitarian public policies that raise certain households above the trap swell the educated share 
of the population, and thereby per capita income. Two policies are analysed and simulated, i.e., the 
setting of a minimum wage and a redistributive action. Both are transitory because they increase the 
number of skilled households for all the subsequent periods and thereby render their continued 
implementation unnecessary. Once executed, these policies increase both efficiency and equality, but 
redistribution is the most efficient because the minimum wage induces unemployment for similar tax 
burden and skill upgrading. In addition, we show that, without public intervention, naïve expectations 
lead to a higher per capita income at the steady state than perfect predictions.     
The paper is organised as follows. Education behaviour is studied in Section 2. Section 3 describes 
production and equilibrium on the factor markets. The main characteristics of the steady state and 
some of the features of the transitional dynamics are examined in Section 4. Section 5 describes public 
policies and the mechanisms these generate. Simulation exercises are implemented and the main 
results of the model are discussed in Section 6.      
 
 
2      Households and education 
 
 
An individual lives through two periods of time. When he is young, he firstly receives basic education 
from his parents over sub-period (1 ) θ − . Following this, i.e. over the remaining sub-period θ , he 
either works, or prolongs his education. As an adult, he works one period of time and he is paid 
according to his skill.  
One household comprises 1 adult (parent) and 1 youngster (child), and the child’s education is decided 
and financed by his parent because, by assumption, children have no access to credit facilities.  
There are M dynasties formed of the successive generations belonging to the same family.  
                                                 
1 In Barham and Boadway (1995), children take the decision, but this decision depends on the parents’ capacity 
to fund education because the market for credit is imperfect.    4
‘Parent (i,t)’ denotes generation t of dynasty i taken as a parent, and ‘child (i,t)’ generation t of dynasty 
i taken as a child, where t refers to the period when the individual becomes adult (parent). A family 
thus comprises parent (i,t) and child (i,t+1).  
Parents are provided with different levels of human capital. Human capital is initially distributed 
across parents (dynasties) over interval  ˆ 1,h ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦ , with  ˆ * hh ≤ ,  * h  being the highest human capital at 
the steady state. The human capital of parent (i,t) is denoted  it h , and his income  it I .  
There are 2 types of occupation, skilled and unskilled.  
 
2.1. Parents’ behaviour and spending on education 
 
As an adult, an individual works one period of time and he can choose between being employed as an 
unskilled or as a skilled worker, whatever his endowment with human capital. We denote  Ht w  the 
wage per unit of human capital, and  Lt w  the wage per unit of unskilled labour, at time t. If he is 
employed as a skilled worker, individual (i,t) receives income it Ht it I wh = , and he receives income 
it Lt I w =  when employed as an unskilled worker. 
 
Lemma 1: At time t, all workers whose human capital is lower (higher) than  / Lt Ht ww  are employed in 
unskilled (skilled) occupations, and  Lt Ht ww ≥ .  
 
Proof: Individual (i,t) only decides to fill a skilled position if  Hti t L t wh w ≥ , i.e.   / it Lt Ht hw w ≥ . As a 
consequence, skill level  / Lt Ht ww  separates households with skilled occupations from those with 
unskilled occupations. Any skilled worker provided with human capital h is such that  HtL t wh w > . 
Since  1 h ≥ , then  Lt Ht ww ≥ . 
 
 
Definition 1: The unit skill premium at time t is the ratio  / HtL t ww  of the wage of one unit of human 
capital working one unit of time on the wage of one unit of time in an unskilled occupation.  
 
Note that  /1 Ht Lt ww <  because  Lt Ht ww ≥  (Lemma 1). In addition, the skill premium of a skilled 
worker provided with human capital h is then  /1 Ht Lt whw>  since, as he has a skilled occupation, 
/ Lt Ht hww > . 
   5
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with : 01 η γ <<< , 01 σ < < , 1 β δ ≤<,  1 δλ > .  
 
Expressions  it h
η  and  it h
γ denote the intra-family externalities ( it h  is the human capital of child 
(i,t+1)’s parent), and  it s  the resource that parent (i,t) allocates to his child’s education.  
it h
η β  is the human capital of child (i,t+1) at the end of the basic education time, which depends on his 
parent’s human capital.  
Inequality  1 δλ >  is a necessary condition for human capital not to decrease over time when parents 
educate their children. Indeed, since  1 it it it it hh sh
γ σγ δ δλ + =<   and  it it hh
γ < , inequality  1 δλ <  would 
always induce lower human capital for educated children than for their parents. 
Feature 
1/
1 it it it sh h
σ γ λ δλ + ≥⇒=  signifies that there is an upper limit 
1/σ λ  in education spending 
above which higher expenditure will produce no impact on the children’s human capital. This 
assumption is consistent with the empirical finding that, after controlling for parents’ skills, an 
increase in parents’ incomes provides no impact on the children’s human capital level for the highest 
incomes (Shea, 2000). Since spending more than 




σ λ ≤  always applies.  
 
Definition 2: The ‘saturation point’ is the income for which the optimal expenditure on higher 
education is exactly equal to the highest efficient expenditure on education
1/σ λ . 
 
To paint an accurate picture of education, it is convenient to rewrite the education function in the 
following fashion:  
N
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it it it it
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− ⎛⎞ ≥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. At the end of basic 
education, child (i,t+1) attains human capital  it h
η β  which depends on his parent’s human capital and 
on the efficiency of basic education β . If further education is not funded, the child directly enters the 
labour market. If his parent funds higher education, they must firstly pay an entry cost 
1




=  that is increasing with the child’s human capital at the end of the basic education.   6
This feature captures the fact that children provided with higher human capital get access to better and 
dearer universities. Note that (i) when parents only pay the fixed cost of higher education, their 
children’s human capital remains at the level reached at the end of basic education, and (ii) the higher 
the parent’s skill and income, the higher the entry cost for his child’s higher education. When a parent 
funds higher education, his child’s human capital  1 it h +  thus depends, (i) on the level  it h
η β  obtained 
from his basic education, (ii) on the intra-family externality in the capture of higher education  it h
γ η − , 
(iii) on the total education expense  ˆ it it ss ≥ , and (iv) on ratio  /1 δ β >  that measures the efficiency of 
higher education. 







−  is the stable steady state of dynamics  1 it it hh
η β + = . 
Parent (i,t)’s total income is used for his own consumption ( it c ) and for his child’s education expense 
it s  (consumption, materials, education fees etc.): 
 
it it it I cs =+           ( 2 )  
with: 
    if     /
        if     /
Hti t i t H t L t
it
Lt it Ht Lt
wh h w w
I
wh w w
≥ ⎧ ⎪ = ⎨
< ⎪ ⎩
        ( 3 )  
 
Parent (i,t)’s utility function depends on his consumption and his child’s future reward for education: 
1 (1 )log log
e
it it it Ua c a I + =− +          ( 4 )  
Coefficient a < 1 measures parents’ altruism and superscript e denotes an expected value. 
Parents’ altruism is here measured by the reward for education, i.e.,  11 1
ee
it Ht it I wh + ++ =  if the child is 
employed as a skilled worker, and  11
ee
it Lt I w ++ =  if he is employed as an unskilled worker. As it does 
not depend on the child’s utility function, there is no dynastic altruism. This reflects the complexity of 
calculating the distribution of human capital for all the subsequent periods when households are 
heterogeneous. In addition, it must be noted that the parent’s utility does not depend on his child’s 
total income. Indeed, if this income is  11
e
Hti t wh + +  for children who pursue higher education, it is 
1
e
Lt Lt ww θ + +  for those children who directly join the labour market after basic education. But these 
two values are not comparable since the former does not integrate the implicit income received by the   7
child pursuing higher education when the parent freely provides him with food, accommodation etc. 
We then suppose that it is the value of the child’s human capital, represented by his income once adult, 
that is accounted for by parents. This is similar to considering the offspring’s human capital when his 
income is proportional to his human capital (Glomm, 1997). 
Parent (i,t) maximises his utility (4) subject to the income constraint (2), the education function (1) and 
his child’s expected income. Given the discontinuity, the decision process is sequential. The parent 
firstly calculates the solution of this programme for  11 1
ee
it Ht it I wh + ++ = , and then verifies that this is his 
optimum. Indeed, the parent provides income for education only if it makes the child fill a skilled 
position, i.e., if  11 1
ee
Hti t L t wh w ++ + > . Moreover, even in this case, the programme solution may not be 
optimal. In fact, the parent must compare the utility deriving from his maximisation programme 
assuming  11 1
ee
it Ht it I wh ++ + = , with that corresponding to zero expense for education, i.e. all income 
being spent on consumption, and  11
ee
it Lt I w ++ =  if the non educated child becomes an unskilled worker 
and  11 ,
ee
it Ht i t I wh
η β ++ =  if he obtains a skilled occupation even without higher education.  
In summary, the household decision process comprises 3 stages: (i) determining the solution of the 
maximisation programme with 11 1
ee
it Ht it I wh ++ + = , (ii) verifying that this solution is consistent with a 
skilled position for the child, and (iii) verifying that the parent’s utility provided by this solution is 
higher than that with no education expense ( it it I c = ). We show that condition (ii) is also met when 
condition (iii) is fulfilled. 
  
Lemma 3: The condition for parent (i,t), to fund his child’s education is: 



















> ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
   if the child has an unskilled occupation when not funded 
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  if the child has a skilled occupation when not funded 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
Lemma 4: If he educates his child, parent (i,t) spends for education: 
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Proof: See Appendix 2.    8







 is below (above) the 
saturation point. 
 
2.2. Intergenerational Skill Mobility 
 
Proposition 1:  Child (i,t+1)’s human capital is: 
1/
1
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σ λ =  into 
1 it it it hh s
γ σ δ + =  in the 3 other cases.  
 
 
Definition 3: The functions that relate child (i,t+1)’s human capital to his  parent’s human capital for 
given values of wages and of the model parameters are called ‘Intergenerational Skill Mobility’ (ISM).  
Proposition 1 shows that there are 4 possible ISMs, and thus 4 related curves (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: The four regimes (ISMs) 
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Figure 1 pictures the 4 curves for  1 γ σ +< . The bold line depicts the operative part of each curve. 
 
 
Figure 1: Intergenerational Skill Mobility   9
 
Let us suppose (this feature is proved further on) that there is a threshold  t h

 such that all parents with 
human capital higher than  t h

 fund their children’s education, and all parents with human capital lower 
than  t h

 do not. The latter dynasties are then situated on curve ISM 1.  All parents (i,t) such that 
it t hh >

 fund their children’s education, and all these children will have more human capital than their 
parents if 
1
1 () it h
γ δλ
− < . For families in which parents’ human capital belongs to interval 
[[ ,/ tL t H t hw w

, i.e., having unskilled positions, the intergenerational increase in skill follows function 









⎡ ⎡ − ⎛⎞ + ⎢ ⎢ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎣
, i.e., parents having 
a skilled occupation and below the saturation point
2, the intergenerational increase in human capital 
follows relation ISM 3, with a quicker increase than in the previous case. Finally, when parents are 
above the saturation point, the intergenerational increase in skill follows relation  1 it it hh





− = . 
 
















, i.e., the intersection of curves ISM3 and ISM4, is human capital at the saturation point.   10
2.3. Conditions 
 
Lemma 3 provides the conditions for parent (i,t) to fund his child’s higher education according to the 
position the child will occupy if not funded. As a matter of fact, parent (i,t)’s decision  to fund his 
child’s higher education depends on three elements:   
(i)  his occupation (skilled/unskilled), 
(ii)  the position of his income regarding the saturation point (below/above), and  
(iii)  the occupation his child will obtain if not funded (skilled/unskilled).  
 
Table 2 depicts the conditions for parent (i,t) to fund his child’s education according to his situation in 




































⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ +− ⎝⎠
, and (iii) the value of 
it I  according to the parent’s occupation. 
 
Table 2: The conditions for parent (i,t) to fund his child’s education 
 Parent (i,t)’s characteristics  Conditions 
 
(1) 
Parent (i,t) has an unskilled occupation 
He is beneath the saturation point 















Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is beneath the saturation point 















Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is beneath the saturation point 
If not educated, his child has a skilled position 
it Ht hc w
γση σ β
+− − >  
 
(4) 
Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is above the saturation point 
























Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is above the saturation point 




































The case in which the parent has an unskilled occupation and his non educated child a skilled one is 
not possible for normal values of the parameters. In addition, we suppose that the model parameters   11
are such (i) that all unskilled parents are below the saturation point, and (ii) that skilled parents can 
attain the saturation point, i.e., ISM 4 always cuts the 45°line before ISM 3.  
The five conditions in Table 2 are ranked according to parents’ skill level. However, cases (3) and (4) 
exclude each other. In fact, since parents related to (3) have lower human capital than those related to 
(4), the children without higher education of the former cannot have more human capital than the 
children without higher education of the latter.   
All parents depend on one of these five conditions. Inside each of the 5 sets of parents, if the related 
condition is fulfilled for parent (i,t), then it is also fulfilled for any parent whose human capital is 
higher than it h . This is because an upward shift in the hierarchy of parents’ human capital always 
increases the left hand side of the related inequality whereas it exerts no impact on (cases 1, 2 and 3), 
or it decreases (cases 4 and 5), its right hand side.  
 
Proposition 2: At any time t, if non educated children have  unskilled occupations, there is one human 
capital threshold  t h

 above which all parents fund their children’s education, and under which all 
parents do not.  
 
Proof:  If we denote ] ] n  the fact that condition (n), n = 1…5, is met by at least one of the parents who 
depend on it, and [ ] n  the fact that (n) is fulfilled by all parents who depend on it, we may show (see 
Appendix 3): ] ] [ ] 12 ⇒ ,  ] ] [ ] 23 ⇒ ,  ] ] [ ] 24 ⇒ , and ] ] [ ] 45 ⇒ . We also know that within each set 
of parents, if the related condition is fulfilled for one of them, then it is fulfilled for all parents with 
higher human capital. Consequently, if parent (i,t) funds his child’s education, all parents with human 
capital higher than  it h  do the same: there is one threshold at each period above which all parents fund 
their children’s education, and below which they do not.  
 
It must be noted that (i) at any time, threshold  t h

 is determined by one of the five considered 
conditions, and (ii)  t h

 changes over time since it depends on the distribution of skills and on the 
wages of both the current period and the subsequent period. For example, if there is at least one 




















3  Production and equilibrium 




There are two factors of production, unskilled labour L and skilled labour H.  
L consists of simple occupations for which no skill is required. In L, one individual’s unit of working 
time represents 1 unit of labour.  
H consists of skilled occupations of different complexity and perfectly substitutable. Individuals’ 
occupation complexity is proportional to their human capital, and one individual’s contribution to H is 
assumed to be equal to his human capital. 
The economy produces one good, the price of which is 1, with the Cobb-Douglas technology: 
 
1
jt jt jt YH L
α α − =           ( 5 )  
Where  jt Y ,  jt H  and  jt L  respectively denote firm j’ s production and use of skilled and unskilled 
labour at time t.  
The amount of skilled and unskilled labour utilised in production are: 
 
12 ttt HHH =+                ( 6 )  
' tL t L t LM M θ =+             ( 7 )  
 
The total of skilled labour  t H  (Relation 6) includes the human capital of parents who occupy skilled 
positions  1





= ∑  and the human capital of children who do not pursue higher education 
















The total of unskilled labour  t L  (Relation 7) includes the parents who occupy unskilled positions 
{ } dim , / Lt it it Lt Ht M hh ww =≤  and the time children who do not continue into higher education and 
do not have human capital enough to be employed in skilled occupations spend as unskilled workers: 
'Lt M θ × ,  { } ' dim  such that:    and   / Lt it it t it Lt Ht M hh h h w w
η β =≤ ≤

 being the number of 
households who do not provide higher education to their children, and whose non educated children 
are employed in an unskilled occupation at time t. 
The firm’s profit maximisation programme determines the factor demands, and thus wages and the 
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3.2. Transitional equilibria 
 
At any time, production, the distribution of parents between skilled and unskilled occupations, as well 
as the amount of each factor may be calculated from Equations (6), (7) and (10). This equilibrium 
directly depends on the distribution of households across the set of available skills because this 
distribution determines both   / HtL t ww  and the amount of unskilled labour supplied by the youth 
'Lt M θ × .  
The determination of  / HtL t ww ,  t H  and  t L  is rather complex. However, it will appear in the 
simulation exercises that all the children who do not go into higher education have an unskilled 
position, and that, except in the first period, all the children with unskilled parents do not pursue 











= ∑            ( 1 1 )  
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4  Steady state and human capital dynamics 
   14
 
4.1. The steady state 
 
Let  / LL mM M ≡  denote the proportion of unskilled households in the population at the steady state, 
and thus  1 H L mm =−  that of skilled households.   
 
Proposition 3: There is a continuum of steady states corresponding to all the proportions of skilled 
household  H m  belonging to a certain interval [ ] *, * HH mm  and characterised by the following 
features: 




− = . 




− = . 
 (3) Skilled and unskilled labour are respectively 
1
1 *( ) H Hm M
γ δλ
− =  and  *( 1 ) L Lm M θ =+ .  
 (4) Production per household  ** / yYM ≡  is  () ()
1 1 1 *( 1 )() HL ym m
α
α α α γ θδ λ
− − − =+ . 






























Proof: Feature (1) results from the steady state of function ISM 4. Feature 2 derives from the steady 
state of ISM 1. Feature (3) is calculated from (14), (15) and (16) and from the fact that all skilled 




− . Feature (4) is obtained by inserting  * H  and  * L  as 
defined in Feature (3) into 
1 YH L
α α − = , and Feature (5) by inserting  * L  and  * H  in Relation (13). 
Interval [ ] *, * HH mm  is built as follows:  * H m  is the lowest value of  * H m  consistent with unskilled 
workers not funding their children’s higher education, and  * H m  the highest  * H m  consistent with 
skilled workers funding their offspring’s higher education. The analytical determination of  * H m  and 
* H m  are described in Appendix 4.  
 
Proposition 4: The share of skilled households in the population that maximises the product per 
capita at the steady state is α . 
   15
Proof: 
1 1 *1











− − ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ∂−
=+ − =⇒ = − = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ∂− ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 
Two features resulting from Propositions 3 and 4 may be pointed out: 
(i)  For  H m α = , i.e. for the share of skilled households in the population that maximises income per 







θ = +>  , which means 
that the least restrictive condition for skilled parents to fund their children’s education is fulfilled.  













, the higher  H m , the lower inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers.  
Three situations may be distinguished from the position of α  with regard to interval [ ] *, * HH mm : 
(i)  If α  belongs to [ ] *, * HH mm , all shares  H m  situated into [ [ *, H m α  are sub-optimal and 
correspond to higher inequality than for  H m α = , and all shares  H m  into ] ] ,* H m α  are sub-optimal 
and correspond to lower inequality than for  H m α = . 
(ii) If   H m α < ,  H m  is the attainable share of skilled labour that is the best in terms of per capita 
income, and it is the least egalitarian in interval [ ] *, * HH mm . 
(iii) If   H m α > ,  H m  is the attainable share of skilled labour that is the best in terms of per capita 
product, and it is the most egalitarian in interval [ ] *, * HH mm . 
 
4.2. Transitional dynamics 
 
The transitional dynamics completely depends on the initial distribution of human capital. As a 
consequence, there is no one single model of transitional dynamics, but an infinity of possible paths 
depending on this initial distribution and on the model parameters. In addition, the transitional 
dynamics also depends on parents’ expectations on wages for the next generation. We explore 2 types 
of expectations, i.e., (i) rational expectations with perfect information, and (ii) naïve expectations. The 
first type of expectations results in a perfect prediction of forthcoming wages. In the second type, we 
suppose that the unit skill premium for the next generation is assumed to be equal to that of the current 
generation by all parents.   
 
Perfect predictions   16
If parents perfectly predict wages in the next period (generation), we have:  11
e
HtH t ww ++ = , 
11
e













Proposition 5:  With perfect predictions, the transitional dynamics is characterised either by a 
decrease in the unit skill premium, or by a decrease in the number of households having skilled 
occupations, or even both.   
 
Proof: Firstly suppose that the number of households employed in skilled positions remains constant 
over time. Since their human capital increases,  t H  also increases, whereas  t L  remains constant. The 
unit skill premium  / H L ww  thereby decreases. If this decrease leads certain households not to educate 
their children because it makes the condition for parents to fund their offspring’s education more 
restrictive, then the number of households with skilled occupations decreases.  
 
Naïve expectations 
In the case of ‘naïve expectations’, every parent anticipates that the following generation will know 
the same unit skill premium as the present one. This does not mean that they consider wages as being 
unchanged, but that they suppose that the relative return from education remains broadly constant 













Proposition 6: When ratio  / tt HL  increases, the condition for skilled parents to fund their offspring’s 
higher education is less restrictive with naïve expectations than with perfect expectations if children 
without higher education have unskilled occupations.  
 
Proof: Because, (i) in conditions (2) and (4) in Table 2, the right hand sides of the related inequalities 
increase with  11 /
ee









> .  
 
Proposition 6 shows that naïve expectations may shape several features:  
(i)   More parents should normally fund their children’s higher education. 
(ii) The amount of labour available for production then decreases because some children who would 
have worked in case of perfect prediction now pursue higher studies.   17
(iii) Certain individuals may choose unskilled positions when they become adults albeit having 
received higher education. 
(iv) At the steady state, the number of households with skilled occupations may be higher (but not 
lower), and inequality lower (but not higher), than in the case of perfect expectations. 
 
Once the model’s parameters are given, the emergence out of the previous features depends on the 
initial distribution of human capital across households. We show in Section 6 that they can be 
produced with reasonable values in the parameters and in the human capital distribution.  
 
Under education Trap 
 
Definition 4: Dynasty i falls into an under-education trap if, once parent (i,t) has decided not to fund 
his child’s higher education, all the following generations of dynasty i do not fund their child’s higher 
education.  
 
For unskilled dynasty i to stand in an under-education trap, it is necessary that threshold  t h

 does not 
decrease fast enough to reach dynasty i’s decreasing human capital. Finally note that a dynasty that 




− =  at the steady state.  
 
 
5      Public policies 
 
 
By assuming no public intervention, we have established (i) that the model dynamics may result in a 
continuum of steady states characterised by the share of skilled households  H m  over interval 













, and (iii) that the 
value of  H m  that maximises the per capita income is α . When  H m  is lower thanα , a rise in the 
share of skilled household could both increase per capita income and reduce inequality.  In a large 
number of situations, there is thus room for public intervention. The problem is to know (i) if such 
policies do really exist, and, if so, (ii) which of them is the most efficient.   
We now analyse the possible impacts of 2 types of public intervention, i.e. the setting of a minimum 
wage and a redistribution policy.    18
The implementation of social policies must be analysed from their 3 impacts on: (i) the parents’ 
income and occupation (skilled/unskilled), (ii) the conditions for parents to fund higher education, and 
(iii) the children’s skill level. As a matter of fact, the impact of the social policy on children’s human 
capital directly depends on its impacts on both parents’ situation and the condition to fund higher 
education. 
 
5.1. Minimum wage 
 
The setting of a minimum wage  Lt w  that is higher than the value  ˆLt w  of  Lt w  at the full employment 
equilibrium results, (i) in an increase in the skill intensity in production (Relation 11), (ii) in a decrease 
in the real wage per unit of skill (Relation 12), (iii) in a decrease in the unit skill premium (Relation 
13), and (iv) in moving those workers whose earnings belong to interval [ ] ˆ , Lt Lt ww from skilled to 
unskilled occupations (or to unemployment). Moreover, for those parents who decide to fund higher 
education with or without minimum wage, their children’s human capital is higher when they have an 
unskilled occupation, and lower when they have a skilled occupation (see Proposition 1).  
The minimum wage modifies parents’ decisions to fund education through several channels. 
It firstly increases the income of all unskilled parents, and it may thereby incite some of them (those 
with the highest human capital) to fund their children’s education. 
The minimum wage secondly causes unemployment because (i) it lowers the demand for unskilled 
labour, and (ii) it increases the supply of unskilled labour as fewer households now work as skilled 
workers. Both these effects are however tempered by the fact that a section of the youths that would 
have worked without a minimum wage now go into higher education. In addition, the emergence of 
unemployed workers implies the setting of unemployment compensations.      
Thirdly, the minimum wage displaces threshold  t h

 that depends on both present and future wages of 
workers employed in skilled and unskilled positions. This third impact is clearly the most complex to 
analyse because the minimum wage generates opposite mechanisms.  
Let us firstly suppose that individuals have perfect predictions. For parents who have unskilled 













>  (see Table 2) because it increases  Lt w . Nevertheless, it also lowers the skill 
premium of the next period ( 11 / HtL t ww ++ ), thereby making the condition more restrictive in the case 
of perfect expectations. It firstly does so if the minimum wage is maintained during the subsequent 
period. We shall however suppose that the minimum wage is not maintained for the next generation, 
which is a normal assumption because, as mentioned thereafter, it is a more efficient tool when it is 
applied rapidly and its impact render its continuation unnecessary. Even in this case, the minimum   19
wage normally results in a decrease in the skill premium of the period after because it augments the 
number of skilled workers. This may curtail the positive effect of the minimum wage on the funding of 














> . Given that it decreases the present wage per unit of skill, the setting of a 
minimum wage makes the condition more restrictive. However, if the minimum wage persuades 
certain unskilled parents to fund their child’s education, all the skilled parents will do the same 
(Proposition 2), and the tightening of the constraint caused by the trap produces no effect.  
Considering parents who decide to fund higher education, their child’s human capital is thus higher for 
households having unskilled occupations, and lower for households having skilled occupations. 
Moreover, since  Ht w  decreases, certain skilled households who would have spent 
1/
it s
σ λ =  for 
education without minimum wage now curb this spending. The number of parents spending 
1/σ λ  for 
their child’s education decreases.  
When expectations are naive, threshold  t h

 goes up with the setting of a minimum wage. Indeed, in the 
five possible cases described in Table 2,  t h

 increases with  Lt w  and decreases with  Ht w . As a 




Redistribution consists in transferring a proportion of total income from the well paid to the low paid 
workers. To be equitable, a redistribution framework must comply with certain features: (i) the net 
transfer must decrease with the pre-redistribution income, and (ii) the redistribution system must not 
modify the hierarchy of incomes. This means that if households i and j are such that i’s income is 
higher than j’s before redistribution, this hierarchy must not be inverted after redistribution. In this 
paper, redistribution consists in levying an income tax on all workers at rate τ  and paying a lump sum 
transfer  t f I τ =  to all workers,  t I  being the average income at time t. This redistribution pattern 
ensures a balanced budget and it meets both features required for equity.  
Redistribution typically modifies skill dynamics. Since it increases the income of parents situated 
under the average wage, their expense for education normally increases and some of them may now 
decide to fund their child’s education. Conversely, the incomes of parents with earnings higher than 
the average wage decrease. They consequently spend less on their child’s education.    
It can be noted that a redistribution policy may produce several undesirable outcomes. 
Firstly, if the skill corresponding to the average wage is lower than threshold  t h

, there is a scope for 
situations where redistribution shifts certain parents from education funding to no education funding.   20
This is however a very unlikely occurrence given that the human capital corresponding to the average 
wage is normally higher than  t h

.  
Secondly, a redistribution policy normally slows down the transitional dynamics towards the steady 
state because all households above the average wage suffer a decrease in their after tax income, 
thereby lowering their education expense. This undesirable result may be limited when the 
redistribution policy is implemented for one generation only. In fact, it is more efficient to concentrate 
redistribution on one generation because, the later the government intervenes, the lower the human 
capital of dynasties that do not fund higher education, and the more difficult and more costly 
redistribution becomes.  
In the simulation carried out in the next section, the redistribution policy will only be implemented 
over the first period and the induced increase in skilled labour will automatically reduce inequality 
during the following periods. 
Finally, as for the minimum wage, a redistribution policy moves certain households from a no funding 
to a funding education decision. It thus lowers the skill premium of the following generation, thereby 
pushing threshold  t h

 up. It is thus likely that over a certain value of τ  the redistribution policy has no 
further impact on families’ education decision.  
 
 
6      Simulations and discussion 
 
 
We now implement a number of simulations that aim to compare the steady state and the transitional 
dynamics according (i) to the type of expectations (perfect or naïve), and (ii) to the behaviour of the 
social planner (no intervention, minimum wage, redistribution).    
We firstly describe the values of the parameters and the initial distribution of human capital selected 
for the simulation exercises. Secondly, we examine the characteristics of the different simulated 
scenarios. The main results of the simulations are finally presented and discussed.   
 
6.1. Parameters and initial conditions 
 
Table 3 depicts the values of the model parameters used in the simulations and Table 3 the initial 
distribution of human capital.  
 
Table 3: values of the parameters  
Parameters  β   σ   δ   a  θ   λ   γ   η   α  
values  2.4 0.3  4.825  0.3 0.3 0.7  0.55  0.25  0.5 
   21
Coefficient α  is equal to 0.5. This indicates that half of total income goes to skilled workers, which is 
consistent with the proportion calculated in the long term for the US and the UK (Lindert, 2000). 
Coefficient γ , i.e. the elasticity of  children’s human capital with respect to that of their parents, takes 
value 0.55, which is consistent with several empirical estimations (Solon, 1999). η = 0.25 indicates 
that 45% of this intra-family externality is captured at the end of basic education. θ = 0.3 signifies that 
basic education accounts for 70% of children’ available time. The elasticity of higher education with 
respect to parents’ expenditure on education, that is only effective for incomes below the saturation 
point, is σ = 0.3, which is consistent with Shea’s calculations (2000). The altruism indicator a is 
chosen equal to 0.3. Coefficients β  = 2.4 and δ  = 4.825 indicate that productivity is slightly higher 
in basic education than in higher education ( / 2.0125 δ β = ). Finally, λ  is selected so as to have a 
saturation point that has a non negligible influence on the skill dynamics.   
It may be noted that, for the selected parameters, (i) skilled workers and unskilled workers 
respectively possess human capital 14.95 and 3.2 at the steady state, and (ii) the optimal proportion of 
skilled workers at the steady state is 50%. In addition,  * 0.365 H m =  and  * 0.888 H m = , which shows 
that coefficient  0.5 α =  belongs to interval [ ] *, * HH mm .  
 
Table 4: Initial conditions 
Human capital at initial time  Weight (%)  Distribution 
Low 70  Uniform distribution over interval ] [ 1.4  
Medium 20  Uniform distribution over interval [[ 4,8  
High 10  Uniform distribution over interval [ [ 8,15  
 
There are 100 dynasties (or: sets of dynasties, each of them accounting for 1% of the total). We 
distinguish 3 groups of human capital at initial time (Table 4). 70% of the parents are initially 
endowed with low human capital and they are uniformly distributed over the interval of human capital 
] [ 1, 4 . 20% of the parents are initially endowed with medium human capital and uniformly distributed 
over the interval of human capital [ [ 4,8 . Finally, 10% of the parents are initially endowed with high 
human capital and uniformly distributed over interval[ [ 8,15 . This distribution is fairly representative 
of the situation of Europe throughout the 60s (OECD, 1986).   
 
6.2. The Scenarios 
 
Six scenarios are successively simulated: no government intervention with perfect predictions 
(denoted NIPP) and with naïve expectations (NINE); the setting of a minimum wage with two possible   22
distributions of the derived unemployment across households (scenarios MW1 and MW2); two 
redistribution policies (RP1 and RP2)
 3.   
 
Minimum wage 
Individuals have perfect predictions and the minimum wage is only set over one period of time, i.e. for 
the first generation. 
Two scenarios with a minimum wage are distinguished according to the distribution of the 
unemployment induced. In the first scenario (MW1), unemployment is uniformly distributed across 
unskilled workers, whereas it only concerns unskilled workers with the lowest human capital in the 
second (MW2). This latter case may be justified by assuming that the most educated unskilled workers 
are more efficient in the job search activity. All things being equal, the first scenario produces more 
unemployment and less educated children than the second. In fact, when unemployment is uniformly 
distributed across unskilled workers, some of them who would otherwise have funded their child’s 
education due to the minimum wage will not do so because they are unemployed. Their children then 
join the unskilled labour force, thereby increasing unemployment.  
The minimum wage is set at the level which allows the highest educational gain, i.e. the greatest 
number of children pursuing higher education. Indeed, as pointed out in Section 5.1., the impact of a 
minimum wage on parents’ income, and thereby on their capacity to fund education, is twofold since it 
increases their pre-tax gains but also increases the tax burden they endure. Given that Scenario MW2 
results in lower unemployment than MW1, it is possible to implement a higher minimum wage and a 
higher tax rate in MW2 than in MW1. As a consequence, the implemented minimum wage 
respectively causes an increase of 10% and 15% in the wage of unskilled workers in MW1 and MW2, 
compared with equilibrium without intervention. The respective related tax burdens (in proportion of 
total income) are 9% and 13.3%.  
 
Redistribution 
The redistribution policy is only implemented over the first period and it is organised as presented in 
section 5.2. We analyse two definitions of the tax rate τ . In a first scenario (RP1), τ  is selected so as 
to reach the same proportion of skilled workers at the steady state as in MW2. This makes it possible 
to compare the outcomes of redistribution with that of the more efficient minimum wage policy, i.e. 
MW2. In a second scenario (RP2), we determine the lowest marginal tax rate τ  that results in a steady 
state as close as possible to the optimal situation, i.e.  H m α = . 
  
 
                                                 
3 Other simulations were implemented that may be obtained from the authors.    23
6.3. Results and discussion 
 
Table 5 depicts the main outcomes of the 5 scenarios.  
Without public intervention and with perfect predictions, the share of households having a skilled 
occupation at the steady state is 35%, which is well beneath the optimal proportion (50%). The 
different public policies, as well as no intervention with naïve expectations, cause (i) a significant rise 
in the proportion of skilled dynasties at the steady state, (ii) an increase the related per capita income, 
and (iii) a reduction in inequality. The two shapes of the redistribution policy lead to identical tax 
rates, and thus identical outcomes.  
 
Table 5: The Scenarios’ outcomes 
  NIPP NINE  MW1  MW2  RP1  &  2  Optimum 
Period 1  1.47  1.43 1.15 1.06 1.45  Product per household 
Steady state  2.1 2.16 2.14 2.16 2.16 
 
2.2025 
Period 1  0.296  0.283 0.249 0.237 0.291  Unit skill premium 
Steady state  0.163  0.132 0.143 0.132 0.132 
 
0.087 
Skill premium at the steady state  2.41  1.95 2.12 1.95 1.95  1.3 
Period 1  40  40 30 28 40       * H m  




4, period 1, %  0  0 25.7  34.3 0  - 
Unemployment compensation**  0 0 33  33 0  - 
Tax rate, period 1, % of total income  0 0 9.0  13.3  13.2 - 
Minimum wage*  no no  1.001  1.055  no  - 
 * Instead of 0,918 for the lowest wage without public intervention. ** As a % of the minimum wage 
 
In all scenarios except NINE, the distribution of dynasties between those who fund their children’s 
higher education and those who do not, takes place at the first period. As a consequence, the 
distribution of dynasties between skilled and unskilled occupations is fully realised at the second 
period. There is an under education trap because all the dynasties that do not fund higher education 
during the first period will remain unskilled later on. When a minimum wage or a redistribution policy 
is implemented over the first period, certain parents fund their children’s education whereas they 
would otherwise not do so. The related dynasties will then remain in skilled occupations over time, 
and thereby increase the share of skilled labour in the population at the steady state. The resulting 
increase in human capital is logically higher when unemployment only concerns those unskilled 
workers with the lowest human capital (MW2) because, when all unskilled workers are equally 
affected by unemployment (MW1), certain households do not finance their children’s education 
because they are unemployed.  
The cost of each policy is rather different. The setting of a minimum wage causes unemployment and 
places a rather high tax burden on the first generation of skilled workers. Scenarios MW2 and RPs 
                                                 
4 The unemployment rate is the ratio of the unemployed population to the working population.   24
demonstrate the same results in terms of human capital and output per head from the second period up 
to the steady state, but the former at the expense of unemployment, a lower per capita income and a 
similar tax burden than the latter in the first period. This shows that redistribution must be considered 
as a better policy than the setting of a minimum wage to boost income and reduce inequality. 
Moreover, when compared with the case of non intervention and perfect prediction, both policies 
trigger a decrease in the per capita income over a number of generations. Indeed, as more children 
pursue higher education, unskilled labour available for production decreases and several periods are 
necessary for this to be offset by the increase in human capital. Output per head outstrips its level in 
scenario NIPP after 7 generations for scenario MW1, and 8 generations for MW2 and RPs. 
With naïve expectations, the improvement at the steady state is reached at the expense of lower per 
capita incomes and a waste of investment in human capital during the first periods of the transitional 
dynamics
5. A number of parents fund higher education for children who will turn out to be unskilled 
once they become adults. This waste of education expenditure comes with lower per capita income 
since the children pursuing higher education do not participate in production.   
Finally note that the policies are more efficient when they are implemented rapidly, i.e., over the first 
period. As threshold  t h





−  (i.e. the steady state without funding higher education) , then the dynasties that 
would fund higher education only because of government intervention (minimum wage or 
redistribution) display a drop in their human capital from generation to generation as long as these 
policies are not implemented, thus making government intervention more difficult and costly. In any 
case, after a certain time, the human capital of these dynasties becomes too small for these policies to 
be efficient.   
 
The above discussion shows that:  
(i)   Both redistribution and a minimum wage increase the share of skilled workers in the working 
population, and thereby output per head and equality at the steady state. However, redistribution is 
more efficient because it makes it possible to reach the same goal without unemployment and with a 
lower tax burden and a higher production during the first period.  
(ii)  These policies only need to be implemented over one period (generation). 
(iii) The sooner they are carried out, the more efficient and the less costly they are.  
(iv) Equality and efficiency are now compatible goals in terms of government intervention. 
(v) Naïve expectations results in higher per capita income at the steady state. This nevertheless comes 
at the cost of inefficient over-education for several generations.  
                                                 
5 In scenario NINE, per capita output outstrips its level in scenario NIPP after 9 generations.   25
All these outcomes stem from the under education trap which is the key element in our model. As 
pointed out by Piketty (2000), such traps emerge in cases of non-convexity. These may result from the 
combination of imperfect market for credit and a threshold, e.g. an exogenous minimal expense for 
education (Galor and Zeira, 1993). In our model, this threshold is endogenously determined and it 
changes over time. If there is a minimal expense for higher education, this has a limited impact on the 
formation of the trap because this expense increases with parents’ income
6. The main cause of the trap 
is the fact that, if their children cannot get a skilled occupation even when being educated, parents 
have no incentive to educate them. This behaviour is linked to the production function in which, unlike 
a large number of models dealing with this problem, skilled and unskilled labour are not perfect 
substitutes and workers are not always paid in proportion to their human capital. In fact, when 
employed in an unskilled occupation, an individual receives the same wage whatever his human 
capital, whereas his wage is proportional to his human capital in skilled occupations. This logically 
means that parents do not fund education when they foresee that their child will occupy an unskilled 
position. The basic rationale is close to that of Barham and Boadway (1995), except that (i) the 
production function is specified, (ii) there is a skill dynamics and a steady state, (iii) the outcome of 
public intervention in terms of output per head can thereby be analysed.  
 
 
7     Conclusion 
 
 
We have shown that, within a model where education is decided by the parents, the ‘natural’ dynamics 
of skill typically leads to a sub-optimal steady state in terms of income per capita. This results from an 
under education trap that divides up the population between skilled and unskilled workers at the steady 
state according to the initial distribution of human capital. When sub-optimality comes from a lack of 
skilled workers, egalitarian policies such as the setting of a minimum wage or redistribution make it 
possible both to increase output per head and reduce inequality because it moves certain households 
out of the trap. These policies may be limited to one period of time (generation) because they create 
the very conditions that make them unnecessary. Moreover, naïve expectations tend to increase the 
number of parents that fund their children’s education, and thus per capita income and equality at the 
steady state. Simulations have been provided about that illustrate and corroborate these findings. 
Obviously, other policies are possible, particularly education policies which are not analysed here. 
Considering educational policies would nevertheless require an extension to the approach so as to 
explicitly model the allocation of resources to educational activities.   
 
                                                 
6 Indeed, parents with higher incomes are more educated and their children have more human capital at the end 




1. Proof of Lemma 3: The condition for parent (i,t), to fund his child’s education is: 
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   if the child has an unskilled position when not funded 

















> ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
  if the child has a skilled position when not funded 
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> .  
In addition, parents finance their child’s education only if it provides them with higher utility than a 
situation with no education funding, i.e.  (0 ) (0 ) it it it it Us Us >> =. Inserting (1) and (2) into (4) yields: 
1 (0 ) ( 1 ) l o g ( ) l o g it it it it Ht it it Us a I s a w hs
γ σ δ + >=− − + . Moreover,  1 (0 ) ( 1 ) l o g l o g it it it Lt Us a I a w + = =− +  
if the non educated child has an unskilled position because then  it it cI =  and  11 it Lt I w ++ = , and 
1 (0 ) ( 1 ) l o g l o g it it it Ht it Us a I a w h
η β + == − +  if the non educated child has a skilled position 
( it it cI =  and  11 it Ht it I wh
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 in the second case. In 












































> , if 
the child has an unskilled position when not funded, and (ii) if the child has a skilled position when not 
funded, he also has a skilled position when funded. As a consequence, conditions (i) and (ii) of 














2. Proof of Lemma 4: If he educates his child, parent (i,t) spends for education: 
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 (ii)   
1/
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By inserting (2),  11 1 it Ht it I wh ++ + = , and (1) into (4), the optimisation programme becomes: 
1 max (1 )log( ) log( )
it
it it it Ht it it s ua I s a w h s
γ σ δ + =− − + . The optimal expense for education determined 










. Finally, since the education expense cannot be higher than 
1/σ λ , 
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3.  Proof of Proposition 2 
 
We start from the conditions for parents to fund higher education according to their characteristics: 
  Parent (i,t)’s characteristics  Conditions 
 
(1) 
Parent (i,t) has an unskilled occupation 
He is beneath the saturation point 

























Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is beneath the saturation point 

























Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is beneath the saturation point 



















Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is above the saturation point 
























Parent (i,t) has a skilled occupation 
He is above the saturation point 
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1. If condition (1) is fulfilled by at least one of its related parents, then condition (2) is fulfilled for 
all parents who depend on it. 
Assume that Condition (1) is fulfilled by at least one unskilled parent. It is then fulfilled by all 
skilled parents because they possess more human capital. As a consequence, all parents 
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. As  Hti t L t wh w >  (Lemma 1),   28
then () Ht it Lt wh w
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> . Condition (2) is 
thus fulfilled by all parents who depend on it.  
2. If condition (2) is fulfilled by at least one of its related parents, then condition (3) is fulfilled for all 
parents who depend on it.  
Moving from condition (2) to condition (3) consists in moving from parents whose no educated 
children have unskilled positions to parents whose non educated children have skilled position, by 
remaining on the same ISM curve. Consequently, the most skilled parent related to (2) (parent (k,t)), 
who is also the least skilled parent related to (5), is such that:  11
ee
Htk t L t whw
η β + + = . By inserting   
11
ee
Htk t L t whw
η β ++ =  into condition (2), we find condition (3):  kt Ht hc w
γ ση σ β
+ −− > , which is then 
verified for all parents who depend on it (since parent (k,t) is the parent with the lowest human capital 
inside this set of parents).  
3. If condition (2) is fulfilled by at least one of its related parents, then condition (4) is fulfilled for all 
parents who depend on it  
If (2) is fulfilled for one parent belonging to the related set of parents, it is also fulfilled for the parent 
(k,t) of that set with the highest human capital, whose expense for education is 
1/
1
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 in condition (2), we obtain condition (4), which is thus fulfilled 
by parent (k,t). Since all parents belonging to the set related to condition (4) have higher human capital 
than parent (k,t), they all fulfil  condition (4). Condition (4) is thus satisfied by all its related parents.    
4. If condition (4) is fulfilled by at least one of its related parents, then condition (5) is fulfilled for all 
parents who depend on it.  
Passing from condition (4) to condition (5) consists in moving from parents whose no educated 
children have unskilled positions to parents whose non educated children have skilled positions. 
Consequently, the most skilled parent related to (4) (parent (k,t)), who is also the least skilled parent 
related to (5), is such that:  11
ee
Htk t L t whw
η β ++ = . If condition (4) is fulfilled for at least one of the 
parents who depend on it, it is then fulfilled by parent (k,t). By inserting   11
ee
Htk t L t whw
η β ++ =  into   29
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, which is then verified for all 
parents who depend on it.  
 
4. Determination of interval [ ] *, * HH mm  
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